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SOCIAL CAPABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*
JONATHAN TEMPLE AND PAUL A. JOHNSON
The conventional wisdom is that postwar economic growth has been unpredict-
able. In the 1960s few observers accurately forecast which countries would grow
quickly. In this paper we show that indexes of social development constructed in
the early 1960s have considerable predictive power. These results indicate the
importance of ‘‘social capability’’ for economic growth. We emphasize that social
arrangements matter for reasons beyond those discussed in recent work on trust
and social capital. However, we are also able to show that one of the indexes may be
a useful proxy for social capital in developing countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom is that long-run rates of economic
growth are not easily predicted. In the 1960s a variety of
observers failed to predict either the East Asian miracle or the
relative failure of sub-Saharan Africa. Prominent researchers and
World Bank teams thought that Korea’s development targets
were unrealistic, and that Burma, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines
would do well. Asia’s prospects were widely thought to be bettered
by Africa’s. In 1967 the World Bank’s chief economist listed seven
African countries that ‘‘clearly have the potential to reach or
surpass a seven percent rate of growth.’’ All of those cited had
negative per capita growth rates over 1970–1988.1
In this paper we argue that so many predictions went awry
because researchers sought the origins of long-run growth in the
wrong places. In particular, they neglected the role of ‘‘social
capability’’ in economic development. We show that an index of
socioeconomic development, constructed in the early 1960s by the
development economists Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris,
could have helped researchers make much better forecasts of
long-run growth rates.
This finding is particularly interesting in that the variable is
not based on ex post observation. Unlike some attempts to
quantify the effect of social factors, one cannot simply attribute
the results to the bias of observers who already know about the
postwar growth experience. In turn, the finding suggests that
* This research greatly benefited from discussions with Stephen Bond, John
Muellbauer, and Stephen Nickell, and from the comments of Olivier Blanchard,
Stephen Redding, and three anonymous referees. Any mistakes are ours.
1. See Easterly [1995] for references and further examples.
r 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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contemporary economists, in seeking to explain growth variation,
should think about some of the issues that interest sociologists,
and that interested the economists of previous decades.
By going back to the raw data compiled by Adelman and
Morris (hereinafter AM), we are also able to investigate which
components of the index are most important to growth. Several of
the components are correlated with growth, mainly because they
help explain factor accumulation. One indicator in particular, the
extent of mass communications, appears to have a direct effect on
TFP growth as well. This effect is robust to the inclusion of a
variety of other variables, including ones reflecting health, urban-
ization, and income distribution. Overall, we think we have
amassed some interesting evidence that fast growth is partly the
outcome of favorable social arrangements.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly
discusses earlier work on society and growth, including reasons
why social arrangements might matter. Section III describes the
construction of the index, and demonstrates that researchers in
the 1960s might have found it a useful predictor of growth. In
Section IV we try to overcome some common objections to the AM
index by examining the growth role of its more ‘‘social’’ compo-
nents. Section V presents the results of some simple robustness
tests. Section VI considers the relation of this paper to other
recent work on social variables, particularly indicators of trust.
Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. SOCIETY AND GROWTH
The idea that society matters for growth is almost as old as
economics itself. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [1992] write that
‘‘the interaction between the organization of a society and its
economic performance was once considered perhaps the fundamen-
tal question of political economy’’ [p. 1095]. Modern social arrange-
ments have sometimes been placed among the preconditions for
economic development, as in United Nations [1951] and the first
mission reports of the World Bank [Spengler 1954].
Abramovitz [1986] has been particularly influential in empha-
sizing the growth role of ‘‘social capability.’’Abramovitz and David
[1996] see social capability as embracing the attributes and
qualities of people and organizations that influence the responses
of people to economic opportunity, yet originate in social and
political institutions. However, few papers have made much
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS966
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progress in identifying such effects on economic development. The
problem with social capability has been, as Abramovitz [1986]
points out, that ‘‘no one knows just what it means or how to
measure it.’’
In the past few years the concept of ‘‘social capital’’ has come
to the fore, with the much publicized work of Putnam [1993].
Writers on social capital have tended to emphasize indicators of
trust and social participation in their empirical work. Extending
these indicators to a wide range of countries is a difficult task. In
any case, it may be that the search for social influences on growth
should cast its net rather wider. We consider the relation of work
on trust to our own research in more detail in Section VI. For now,
we simply want to emphasize that the links between society and
development are potentially wide-ranging.
Why might society matter? Recent theoretical work has
emphasized the interaction between social arrangements and the
incentive structure. Fershtman, Murphy, and Weiss [1996] inves-
tigate the links between social status, the allocation of talent
across occupations, and growth. Galor and Tsiddon [1997] present
an explicit theoretical model in which social impediments to
earnings mobility will distort the allocation of talent, lower the
frequency of innovations, and reduce growth.
The importance of society goes beyond the extent of social
mobility and the allocation of talent. Often, researchers have
argued that conservative attitudes can hold back modern develop-
ment. For instance, ‘‘modernization theorists’’ argued that the
traditional extended kin group, a common feature of developing
countries, might be a particular obstacle to economic growth.
Some of their ideas have been criticized, but their work indicates
the broad range of mechanisms that might be relevant. The data
compiled by AM reflect this range, and we now turn to the
construction of their index.
III. THE ADELMAN-MORRIS INDEX
This paper takes as its starting point an ambitious project
carried out in the 1960s by the development economists Adelman
and Morris, and documented in AM [1967]. Their aim was to study
the interaction of economic and noneconomic forces in the course
of development. First, we examine the construction of their social
development index, and then we turn to its empirical usefulness.
SOCIAL CAPABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 967
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1. The Construction of the Index
AM began with data on 41 social, political, and economic
indicators for 74 developing countries, generally for the period
1957–1962. Some of the indicators were based on published
statistics; others necessarily combined data with informal assess-
ments, including information from about 30 country and regional
experts, using written answers and interviews. One goal of the
study was to understand the interaction between political and
social arrangements and economic growth, and so for part of their
analysis AM restricted their attention to data on 1961 per capita
GNP and the 24 indicators deemed not to be purely economic.
They used factor analysis on this data set to construct a
measure of socioeconomic development. The technique is a method
of data reduction, and attempts to describe the indicators as
linear combinations of a small set of underlying latent variables.2
The first factor in their analysis, that accounting for more
variation in the data than any other, was interpreted as reflecting
socioeconomic development, a reasonable judgment given the
indicators with which it was most strongly associated.
To obtain their final results, AM eventually decided to omit
two of the 24 indicators: the degree of cultural and ethnic
homogeneity, and the extent of national integration. Their justifi-
cation is that inclusion of these indicators led to country rankings
that were inappropriate [AM, 1967, pp. 168–169].3 The final index
is given in Table IV-5 of AM [1967], and for brevity we refer to it as
SOCDEV.
Using the raw data published in AM [1967], we have been
able to replicate their factor analysis. The first factor in our own
analysis has a correlation with SOCDEV of 0.993. Further
investigation suggested that the index is robust to two changes:
the omission of 1961 per capita income, and the inclusion of the
two indicators that AM omitted. When these changes are made,
the two new indexes have correlations with SOCDEV of 0.994 and
0.981, respectively. The strength of these correlations indicates
that nothing substantial turns on these choices of AM.
2. For further discussion see Adelman and Morris [1968], Rayner [1970],
Brookins [1970], Tekiner [1981], and Bumb [1982]. For more on factor analysis see,
for instance, Harman [1976] or Everitt [1984].
3. AM argue that inclusion of these two indicators results in the index being
too high for some Middle Eastern countries and too low for some Latin American
countries. Hence the final index combines factor analysis with a subjective
assessment.
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2. Assessing the Usefulness of the Index
For convenience, we list the values of SOCDEV in Table I. We
order countries by the value of SOCDEV (least developed first)
and divide countries into the three groups identified by AM. They
describe the three groups in these terms [1967, p. 169]:
. . . the group of countries with the lowest factor scores consists of
societies that are primarily tribal and that are characterized by a preponder-
ant nonmarket sector. The intermediate group is made up of countries in
which the typical kinship structure is the extended family and in which the
exchange sector of the economy is generally much larger than it is in the
lowest group. The highest group includes only countries that, although still
TABLE I
THE ADELMAN-MORRIS INDEX (SOCDEV)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Niger 21.86 Myanmar 20.41 Colombia 0.66
Chad 21.70 Indonesia 20.40 Peru 0.68
Malawi 21.57 Bolivia 20.35 El Salvador 0.71
Benin 21.54 India 20.28 Egypt 0.73
Guinea 21.47 Tunisia 20.18 Mexico 0.75
Sierra Leone 21.39 Pakistan 20.08 Costa Rica 0.78
Nepal 21.36 Iraq 20.03 Brazil 0.79
Somalia 21.35 Ghana 20.01 Dominican Rep. 0.81
Yemen 21.35 Iran 0.09 Panama 0.84
Cameroon 21.34 Zimbabwe 0.14 Korea 0.85
Madagascar 21.31 Jordan 0.16 Nicaragua 0.88
Tanzania 21.22 Algeria 0.18 Turkey 0.88
Uganda 21.22 Honduras 0.26 Paraguay 0.97
Laos 21.06 Guatemala 0.35 Taiwan 1.05
Afghanistan 21.02 Sri Lanka 0.35 Jamaica 1.06
Liberia 21.01 Thailand 0.50 Cyprus 1.08
Ethiopia 20.99 Ecuador 0.54 Trinidad 1.15
Ivory Coast 20.98 Surinam 0.54 Venezuela 1.37
Nigeria 20.91 Philippines 0.56 Chile 1.39
Zambia 20.89 Syria 0.57 Lebanon 1.44
Gabon 20.83 South Africa 0.62 Greece 1.47
Libya 20.68 Uruguay 1.59
Sudan 20.64 Japan 1.63
Morocco 20.57 Israel 1.77
Cambodia 20.55 Argentina 1.91
Kenya 20.53
Senegal 20.52
South Vietnam 20.49
Benin was called Dahomey at the time of the AM study. Their figure for ‘‘UAR’’ corresponds to Egypt, not
the unification of Egypt and Syria between 1958–1961. The figure we report for Tanzania is the AM index for
Tanganyika, which merged with Zanzibar in 1964 to become the modern Tanzania.
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underdeveloped in the late 1950s, are relatively advanced with respect to
both social and economic development.
There are some interesting conclusions to be drawn from
Table I. One of the first points to note is that the group 1 countries,
ranked the lowest in terms of socioeconomic development, are
predominantly drawn from sub-Saharan Africa. The table also
indicates that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were ranked
highly by the index. Another Asian success story, Thailand, is
ranked toward the top end of group 2. The respective growth
experiences of these countries since the early 1960s suggests that
the AM index might well have some explanatory power.
In Figure I, SOCDEV is plotted against the log of 1960 per
capita income. The close relation between social development and
per capita income, noted in AM [1965, 1967] and replicated here
using the Summers-Heston data set, is an interesting result in
itself.4 Clearly, the direction of causality is uncertain, and there
are presumably links running in both directions. A higher level of
social development is likely to be reflected in higher investment
and lower population growth, raising steady state income, while
economic development is often felt to bring far-reaching social
changes in its wake.
In Figure II we plot growth between 1960 and 1985 against
the level of social development. However, rather than simply use
SOCDEV, we use the component of it that is orthogonal to initial
per capita income. This is because, although growth may be
positively related to social development, it is generally thought to
be negatively related to initial income. To avoid this problem, we
regress SOCDEV on the log of initial income, and take the
residuals to be the orthogonal component.
It is clear from Figure II that there is a strong correlation
between long-run growth and social development relative to
initial income. The simple correlation coefficient is 0.60, and the
Spearman’s rank correlation is 0.54. This in itself suggests that
SOCDEV is useful in explaining growth variation.
We can also demonstrate this using regressions.5 The core
data set and sample is that of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil [1992]
(hereinafter MRW). The dependent variable is the log difference in
4. Adelman and Morris [1967] showed that 70 percent of the variation in per
capita incomes can be explained using their four factors.
5. Strictly speaking, we should estimate the regressions and the factor
analysis model jointly, to overcome the ‘‘generated regressor’’ problem. For
transparency we instead use OLS, but this does mean that the standard errors
reported here may slightly understate the true degree of uncertainty.
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per capita income, 1960–1985. The results are reported in Table
II. For the moment, concentrate on the simplest models, 1 and 2.
In model 1, SOCDEV is significantly positive, and explains 10
percent of the variation in growth rates (and more than 20 percent
if the outliers Argentina, Cameroon, and Venezuela are removed).
As one would expect, the results are rather stronger when initial
income is also included in the growth equation to account for
convergence effects, as in model 2. These two variables can
explain nearly 40 percent of the growth rate variation, and
SOCDEV is strongly significant.6 This result is robust to the use of
regional dummies, as in model 3.
There is good reason to believe that use of the index would
6. It is worth remembering that most growth regressions explain only around
50 percent of the variation in growth rates, and use data subsequent to 1960, such
as average investment rates.
TABLE II
CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSIONS USING SOCDEV
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per capita, 1960–1985
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 0.39 4.28 3.21 5.33 4.60
(7.24) (5.29) (4.06) (3.54) (3.11)
SOCDEV 0.13 0.45 0.23 0.23 0.09
(2.46) (5.61) (2.23) (2.42) (0.81)
ln (I/GDP) 0.35 0.35
(3.12) (3.21)
ln (n 1 g 1 d) 20.09 0.09
(0.19) (0.21)
ln (SCHOOL) 0.18 0.07
(2.05) (0.73)
ln (GDP60) 20.53 20.36 20.53 20.39
(4.82) (3.28) (5.27) (3.79)
AFRICA 20.38 20.40
(2.85) (2.81)
LATINCA 20.20 20.12
(1.49) (0.91)
EASTASIA 0.32 0.26
(1.27) (1.11)
INDUST 0.33 0.29
(1.55) (1.39)
R2 0.09 0.36 0.51 0.50 0.61
s 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.29
N 60 60 60 60 60
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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have helped improve growth forecasts. When just initial income is
used to model the growth rate for these 60 countries, the R2 is less
than 0.01, and the standard error of the regression is 0.43
compared with 0.35 here. Hence anyone armed with AM [1967]
might have done rather better at forecasting growth than their
contemporaries.
It is also worth emphasising that the effect of SOCDEV is
quantitatively strong. As measured by model 2 over 25 years, a
one-standard-deviation increase in this variable would raise the
annual growth rate by 1.8 percentage points. As an illustrative
example, if India had achieved the same level of social develop-
ment on this measure as South Korea by 1960, then its income per
capita would have grown at just over 3 percent a year instead of
1.3 percent. India’s per capita income in 1985 would then have
been almost 60 percent higher.
In principle, we could envisage a number of reasons for the
strength of the effect. It may be that countries with a relatively
high level of the index are converging to a higher steady state level
of income, perhaps because the index proxies for the overall level
of efficiency. Other possibilities are that higher levels of socioeco-
nomic development are associated with greater investment in
physical and human capital, with more productive investments,
or with a greater ability to assimilate technology from abroad.
These explanations for the role of SOCDEV are not mutually
exclusive.
There is some evidence that countries with higher levels of
socioeconomic development invest more in physical capital and
schooling. Using the MRW data on investment and schooling, the
correlations with SOCDEV are 0.56 and 0.83, respectively. The
component of the index orthogonal to income is also correlated
with investment and schooling. This suggests that the AM index
will be useful in explaining cross-country variation in factor
accumulation.
We also examine the direct effect of social arrangements on
growth, acting through total factor productivity (TFP). To study
this, we work with a standard regression specification based on
MRW:
(1) ln
Y(t)
L(t)
2 ln
Y(0)
L(0)
5 u ln A(0) 1 G(X) 1 u
a
1 2 a 2 b
ln (sk)
1 u
b
1 2 a 2 b
ln (sh) 2u
a 1 b
1 2 a 2b
ln (n 1 g 1 d) 2 u ln
Y (0)
L(0)
,
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where Y(t)/L(t) is per capita income at time t, sk and sh are the
rates of physical and human capital accumulation, a and b are
technology parameters, n is population growth, g is efficiency
growth, and d is the rate of depreciation. A(t) is the level of
efficiency at time t, and G(X ) is the rate of efficiency growth
expressed as a function of the variables X. Note that in principle
we should estimate the equation by nonlinear least squares,
replacing g in the fifth term by the function G(X ). In practice, this
does not work well, and most growth researchers work with a
specification very similar to (1), making the standard assumption
that g is 0.02.
Estimates of this equation are presented as regression mod-
els 4 and 5 in Table II. From model 4, it is clear that SOCDEV
remains positive and significant even when controlling for invest-
ment rates. This suggests that the index has a direct effect,
beyond that on factor accumulation, although it is no longer
precisely measured given the inclusion of a full set of regional
dummies. When we add dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, East Asia, and the industrialized countries,
SOCDEV is no longer significant at the .05 level. However, only
one of the dummies is significant at conventional levels.
Overall, models 2 and 3 suggest that the index compiled by
AM is a useful predictor of subsequent growth performance. It
helps predict growth even when we use subsequent information,
such as the averages of investment, schooling, and population
growth that enter model 4. This direct effect is of particular
interest, since it indicates that social arrangements might matter
via technology transfer, just as Abramovitz [1986] proposed.
However, the direct effect is not so strong that it is robust to
the inclusion of regional dummies. When controlling for invest-
ment, it seems that much of the explanatory power of the index
comes from its variation between regions. In the next section we
will investigate measures of social capability for which the direct
effect is more robust.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE ADELMAN-MORRIS APPROACH
In the working paper version of this research [Temple and
Johnson 1996], we presented a range of evidence suggesting that
SOCDEV is a robust determinant of economic growth, and that
this effect operated partly via TFP growth. However, a common
reaction was that the construction of the index by AM used a
range of economic and social variables, and so may capture the
SOCIAL CAPABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 975
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notion of social capability only imperfectly. A second criticism,
closely related, was that this work failed to shed much light on
why society might matter.
1. Measuring Social Capability
To address these criticisms, and measure social capability
more accurately, first we need to return to the original construc-
tion of the index. The final version of SOCDEV was constructed
using a factor analysis of per capita GNP and 22 social and
political variables. SOCDEV was the first factor, and was inter-
preted as representing ‘‘the processes of changes in attitudes and
institutions associated with the breakdown of traditional social
organization’’ [AM 1967, p. 153]. The justification for this interpre-
tation is that the first factor placed most weight on the socioeco-
nomic indicators listed in Table III, which also shows the factor
loadings.7
Of these indicators, several are distinctively ‘‘social.’’ Among
them is the ‘‘character of basic social organization,’’ which we call
KINSHIP. This categorizes countries by the dominance of the
immediate family over the extended family or clan, and tribal
allegiances. AM also classified countries by their ‘‘modernization
of outlook.’’ This variable, OUTLOOK, included an assessment of
social and political participation, for instance through voluntary
associations, and so might be thought of as a cross-country index
7. Remember that other indicators enter the calculation of the first factor
scores, but are much less important. A full list, together with factor loadings, is
presented in the Appendix.
TABLE III
SOCIOECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF THE ADELMAN-MORRIS INDEX
Factor loading
Size of the traditional agricultural sector 20.89
Extent of dualism 0.84
Extent of urbanization 0.84
Character of basic social organization 0.83
Importance of indigenous middle class 0.82
Extent of social mobility 0.86
Extent of literacy 0.86
Extent of mass communications 0.88
Crude fertility rate 20.63
Degree of modernization of outlook 0.75
Note that the signs in Table III are reversed from those in AM, to bring them into line with their final
calculation of SOCDEV. A full list of the factors and their loadings can be found in the Appendix.
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of social capital. It also included a judgment of the support for
political and economic modernization.
Other variables are more familiar to economists, and those
such as the literacy rate and the fertility rate have rather less
claim to represent the extent of social capability. One or two
variables are borderline: AM attempted to measure the extent of
social mobility using data on secondary school enrollment rates,
in addition to information on access to middle class professions.
Hence, of the variables used to construct SOCDEV, some are
conventionally ‘‘economic’’ and one or two of the ‘‘social’’ indicators
were derived using data that are already familiar to growth
researchers, such as school enrollments. Hence the explanatory
power of the index may ultimately rest on its economic compo-
nents, and it perhaps does not have much to say beyond variables
already in common use.
We address these criticisms by concentrating on just five of
the indicators that AM used to construct their index, the ones that
seem most likely to capture differences in social arrangements.
When combined with initial income, any of these five social
indicators helps predict growth. One of the indicators, the extent
of mass communications in the early 1960s, has a particularly
strong correlation with subsequent growth, and seems to have a
direct effect on TFP growth as well as on factor accumulation. In
Section V we will show that this effect is robust to the inclusion of
a wide range of variables used in other studies. In Section VI we
consider the relation between this communications index and
SOCDEV, and the indicators of trust and civic community used by
Knack and Keefer [1997] and La Porta et al. [1997].
2. Decomposing the Index
Of the indicators listed in Table III, five seem best suited to
capturing differences in social arrangements. Two of them we
have already discussed: the character of basic social organization
(KINSHIP) and the modernization of outlook (OUTLOOK). The
remaining three are the extent of mass communications (COMMS),
the extent of social mobility (MOBILITY), and the importance of
the indigenous middle class (MIDCLASS).
Full descriptions of these variables can be found in AM
[1967], but brief summaries may be useful. COMMS is an
assessment of communications, based on newspaper circulation
and the number of radios per head. MOBILITY is based on school
enrollment data, an assessment of the importance of the middle
class, and the presence or absence of cultural or ethnic barriers to
SOCIAL CAPABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 977
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social mobility. Finally, the variable MIDCLASS is intended to
reflect the importance of the indigenous middle class, rising with
the proportion of men employed in the professions, and falling
with a greater role for expatriates in these professions.
Our initial approach was to derive an index of social capabil-
ity based on subsets of these five indicators. We took as our first
index, PCSOC5, the first principal component of all five variables.
Since the variable MIDCLASS may partly reflect economic inequal-
ity or human capital, we omitted it from the construction of a
second index, PCSOC4, the principal component of the remaining
four variables. Since the social mobility indicator is based partly
on school enrollment data, we omitted both MIDCLASS and
MOBILITY from the construction of a third index, PCSOC3. In
practice, the exact composition does not make much difference:
the correlations between these three indices are all greater than
0.97. The correlation between PCSOC5 and SOCDEV is 0.94.
We estimated the regression models in Table II using these
new indexes in place of SOCDEV. The results from all three
indexes were qualitatively similar, as one would expect given the
high correlations between them.8 PCSOC5 gave marginally better
results, and for brevity, we report in Table IV simply the coeffi-
cient on PCSOC5 for the five different models. The results are
slightly weaker than those using SOCDEV. However, the vari-
ables constructed purely from social components remain helpful
in explaining subsequent growth.
As before, the effect of the social variables is not robust to the
inclusion of factor accumulation and a full set of regional dummies
8. Full results available on request. We also constructed an index by
regressing SOCDEV on three social indicators (COMMS, KINSHIP, and OUT-
LOOK) and using the fitted values in growth regressions. Again, the findings were
qualitatively similar.
TABLE IV
REGRESSIONS USING FIRST PRINCIPAL COMPONENT
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per capita, 1960–1985
Model 1 2 3 4 5
PCSOC5 0.11 0.38 0.19 0.16 0.06
(1.99) (4.35) (1.87) (1.68) (0.61)
R2 0.06 0.25 0.50 0.48 0.61
s 0.42 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.29
Regression models are those used in Table II. The constant and other coefficients are omitted to save
space. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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(although, again as before, only one regional dummy is signifi-
cant). Next, we ask whether this is also true of the individual
social components. In Table V we examine the growth effects of
these variables in two ways. First, we consider their explanatory
power when initial income is the only other control variable. This
gives some indication of the overall effect of the social variable,
whether it acts through TFP growth or via factor accumulation.
Second, we enter each social variable into a full growth regression,
including factor accumulation and regional dummies as in the last
columns of Table II and IV. This allows us to investigate the direct
effect on TFP growth.
All the social variables except OUTLOOK are significant at
the .05 level when entered into a very simple growth regression.
This supports our claim that growth forecasts made in the 1960s
would have been improved by using proxies for social arrange-
ments. The effect of mass communications is particularly strong;
combined with initial income, these two variables explain about
30 percent of the variation in growth rates. If three influential
outliers are omitted (Ghana, Japan, and Syria), then this figure
rises to 40 percent.
TABLE V
GROWTH REGRESSIONS USING SOCIAL COMPONENTS
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per capita, 1960–1985
Social var COMMS OUTLOOK KINSHIP MOBILITY MIDCLASS
Constant 3.06 1.20 1.74 2.17 1.52
(4.24) (1.67) (2.59) (3.11) (2.37)
Social var 1.35 0.35 0.59 0.80 0.87
(4.72) (1.45) (2.93) (3.49) (2.79)
ln (GDP60) 20.45 20.13 20.22 20.29 20.22
(4.01) (1.23) (2.23) (2.77) (2.16)
R2 0.28 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.12
s 0.37 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.41
N 60 60 60 60 60
Social variables in full growth regression with regional dummies
(Other variables omitted for brevity)
Social var 0.85 20.24 20.12 0.04 0.13
(2.84) (0.69) (0.60) (0.19) (0.52)
R2 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
s 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
N 60 60 60 60 60
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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It is also interesting to consider whether these variables
remain significant when controlling for factor accumulation and
regional dummies. As we pointed out earlier, existing studies
based on indexes of social capital find that the effects are not
robust to the inclusion of the investment ratio. The second half of
Table V shows that this is also true for the AM variables, with the
important exception of the mass communications index.
This variable, COMMS, is highly correlated with SOCDEV
(r 5 0.88), but its direct effect is more robust. It is significant even
when controlling for investment, human capital accumulation,
population growth, and four regional dummies. This indicates
that there is an effect of social arrangements on TFP growth as
well as that on factor accumulation. Over 25 years the measured
impact of changes in communications is substantial. A one-
standard-deviation change in COMMS is found to raise the TFP
growth rate by one percentage point.9
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Our results might be driven by omitted variables, or by
influential outliers. In this section we turn to robustness testing.
We take particular care to show that the relationship between
social indicators and growth is robust to the inclusion of variables
measuring human capital, urbanization, income inequality, and
political stability. We consider the impact of 30 extra variables in
all. Since we also include four regional dummies, this is a far more
stringent test than those usually implemented in the literature.
The relationship we concentrate on is that between COMMS
and TFP growth. As we have seen, the other social variables are
likely to work best as an explanation of the international variation
in factor accumulation, and measurement of their direct effect on
TFP is not robust to the inclusion of the investment ratio and
regional dummies. Other researchers report a similar finding
[Knack and Keefer 1997], and hence it is the surprising robust-
ness of COMMS that seems most worthy of further attention.
1. Controlling for Other Variables
We start by considering a range of variables representing
educational achievement, health, urbanization, and income distri-
9. As a useful example, consider South Korea and the Philippines, two
countries sometimes regarded as having similar initial conditions. In the early
1960s the communications index was one and a half standard deviations higher in
South Korea.
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bution. All the variables we try are measured in 1960, or averaged
over 1960–1964, unless stated otherwise. In Table VI we show the
coefficient on COMMS when each variable is added to the full
growth regression including regional dummies. To save space,
only this coefficient and that on the new variable are reported.
One concern about COMMS is that it may simply act as a
proxy for human capital. When we try a variety of human capital
TABLE VI
ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR COMMS
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per capita, 1960–1985
Regressor Description COMMS New var R2 N Source
Education variables
BSHUM Average years of
schooling in 1965
0.62
(1.77)
0.08
(1.42)
0.70 51 Benhabib and
Spiegel [1994]
HUMAN Average years,
over-25s, in 1960
0.61
(1.64)
0.02
(0.52)
0.64 50 Barro and Lee
[1994]
SEC Secondary school
enrollment rate
0.92
(3.08)
20.20
(0.40)
0.66 57 Barro and Lee
[1994]
TEASEC Pupil/teacher ratio 0.72
(1.94)
0.26
(0.42)
0.75 44 Barro and Lee
[1994]
GEETOT Ratio of education
expenditure to
GDP
0.93
(2.75)
20.10
(0.02)
0.65 56 Barro and Lee
[1994]
Health variables
FERT Fertility rate 0.90
(2.92)
0.04
(0.73)
0.67 59 Barro and Lee
[1994]
MORT Infant mortality
rate (ages 0–1)
0.86
(2.73)
0.06
(0.05)
0.66 59 Barro and Lee
[1994]
LIFEEXP Life expectancy at
birth
0.79
(2.43)
0.49
(0.59)
0.66 59 Barro and Lee
[1994]
Urbanization and income distribution
URBAGG Proportion living in
urban agglom-
erations
0.84
(2.13)
0.86
(0.91)
0.66 45 Authors (see notes)
URBWB Urbanization 0.95
(2.78)
20.18
(0.44)
0.66 59 World Bank [1992]
MID Income share of
3rd and 4th
quintiles
1.00
(2.75)
0.74
(0.61)
0.74 39 Perotti [1996]
t-statistics are in parentheses. Comparable cross-country data on urbanization are difficult to obtain
because definitions of ‘‘urban’’ differ across national censuses. To avoid this problem, we used data on cities
from the U.N.’s World Urbanization Prospects [1995] to construct a more comparable measure, the proportion
of the population living in urban agglomerations with over 750,000 people, as of 1960. We call this variable
URBAGG. As a further robustness test, we experiment with an urbanization index for 1965 taken directly
from the 1992 World Development Report [World Bank 1992]. This index is not strictly comparable across
countries, but has wider coverage.
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variables, while retaining MRW’s original index SCHOOL, then
COMMS remains positively signed in each regression, and is
significant at the .10 level for all variables except HUMAN. In the
case of HUMAN, the index only just misses significance at the .10
level, while HUMAN itself is not significant.
We also tried splitting the indexes of educational achieve-
ment into one for males and one for females. This seems a useful
exercise, given the observation of Stokey [1994] that differences
between male and female schooling can act as a proxy for
geographic regions or ethnic groups that educate women differ-
ently from men. Hence including these two variables may weaken
the effect of our measure of social arrangements. Again, COMMS
was almost significant at the .10 level, while the new educational
indexes were negatively signed and insignificant even at the .30
level.
Given that the fertility rate is one of the social indicators used
by AM, it is particularly important to test the effect of fertility. The
effect of COMMS is robust to the inclusion of this variable and
other indicators of health status. Nor is the result weakened by
the inclusion of data on urbanization or income inequality.10
Table VII summarizes the robustness of COMMS to another
selection of variables, including four indicators of trade policy and
specialization, and indexes of political instability and ethnic
diversity. Of this selection, only the measure of the fiscal surplus
for the 1960s (SURP) provides any evidence of nonrobustness.
However, it seems likely that one reason for this is the small
sample. Data on the fiscal surplus for the 1960s are available only
for a relatively small subset of the countries considered here (38).
To explore this further, we tried including instead the fiscal
surplus for the 1970s, data on which are available for 54 of the
countries. In this case, the communications index is significant
even at the .01 level.
We also tried several variables not reported here, the most
noteworthy being ICRGE80, a survey measure of institutional
quality used by Knack and Keefer [1995]. The direct effect of
COMMS was robust to these as well.
We have demonstrated that only one variable, SURP, pro-
vides any firm evidence against the robustness of COMMS. A
10. As well as the Perotti measure reported in Table VI, we tried using data
on Gini coefficients from the new income distribution data set designated ‘‘high
quality’’ by Deininger and Squire [1996]. Unfortunately, this limited the sample to
twenty countries. For what it is worth, COMMS was significant at the .10 level,
while the Gini coefficient was not.
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further question that might be asked is whether combinations of
the variables also provide evidence against robustness. To investi-
gate this, we carry out an extreme bounds analysis along the lines
of Levine and Renelt [1992]. Our own analysis is considerably
more stringent, in that we draw combinations of three variables
from ten possibilities (BSHUM, FERT, LIFEEXP, URBAGG, MID,
BMP, SXP, SPI, SURP, GOVSH) and also retain the four regional
dummies.
TABLE VII
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR COMMS
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per capita, 1960–1985
Regressor Description COMMS New var R2 N Source
Trade variables
EX Export share 0.72
(2.08)
20.30
(0.68)
0.68 55 Barro and Lee
[1994]
BMP Black market pre-
mium
0.91
(3.12)
20.30
(2.07)
0.70 57 Barro and Lee
[1994]
OPEN6590 Years open, 1965–
1990
0.86
(2.55)
0.06
(0.36)
0.66 54 Sachs and Warner
[1995a]
SXP Primary export
share in GNP,
1970
0.85
(2.68)
21.15
(2.17)
0.69 54 Sachs and Warner
[1995b] (updated
and revised)
Political instability and ethnic diversity
SPI Sociopolitical
instability
1.10
(2.51)
20.53
(0.13)
0.70 38 Perotti [1996]
ASSASS Incidence of assas-
sinations, 1960s
0.87
(2.74)
0.50
(0.61)
0.65 58 Easterly and
Levine [1997]
WAR Dummy for war on
national terri-
tory, 1960s
0.84
(2.80)
0.02
(0.20)
0.66 60 Easterly and
Levine [1997]
ETHNIC Ethnic diversity 0.85
(2.81)
20.22
(0.01)
0.66 60 Easterly and
Levine [1997]
Miscellaneous variables
SURP Fiscal surplus,
1960s
0.16
(0.37)
21.39
(0.64)
0.76 38 Easterly and
Levine [1997]
GOVSH Government con-
sumption (ratio
to GDP)
0.83
(2.69)
20.63
(0.92)
0.66 59 Barro and Lee
[1994]
RELMACH Relative price of
machinery
0.91
(2.56)
20.01
(0.06)
0.69 43 Jones [1994]
LLY Financial depth,
1960s
0.80
(2.53)
0.34
(0.81)
0.68 56 Easterly and
Levine [1997]
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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We found that, in the 175 regressions carried out, COMMS
was almost always positively signed. It is not too difficult to find
combinations of variables such that COMMS is no longer signifi-
cant at the .10 level, but these tend to be combinations that yield a
small number of observations.11 For instance, if we run a regres-
sion including BSHUM, URBAGG, and SPI, the t-ratio on the
communications index is just 0.6, but this regression is restricted
to just 25 observations.
Hence the conclusions to be drawn from the extreme bounds
analysis are mixed. It should be noted that few variables are likely
to survive such a stringent test (see, for example, Sala-i-Martin
[1997]). In particular, in Tables VI and VII above, most of the
variables emphasized in the literature were already insignificant
when we included COMMS. This suggests that our results are
more robust than many of those reported by previous researchers.
It should also be remembered that in this section we are only
studying the direct effect of COMMS on TFP growth. Earlier
results indicate that social variables also matter for factor
accumulation.
2. Outliers
A frequent concern with growth regressions is that the results
may be driven by a few outlying observations. We check this by
reestimating every regression reported in this paper using a
robust estimator, least trimmed squares. A small group of observa-
tions with high residuals in the least trimmed squares estimates
is then dropped from an otherwise straightforward OLS regres-
sion. This technique, known as reweighted least squares or
RWLS, is recommended by Rousseeuw and Leroy [1987] and has
previously been applied by Temple and Voth [1998] and Temple
[1998].
In one or two cases, the omission of outliers did weaken the
results slightly. In the case of SXP, the share of primary exports in
GNP, the t-ratio on the communications index fell to 1.95, which
still indicates significance at the .10 level. In the case of ETHNIC,
ethnic diversity, the t-ratio fell to 1.72. In the case of ICRGE80,
the adequacy of institutions, the t-ratio fell to 1.61, and so the
communications index just missed significance at the .10 level.
For the most part, however, we found that our results were
considerably strengthened by the omission of a few outliers. For
11. We also repeated the 175 regressions but excluding six influential outliers
(Argentina, Chad, Chile, India, Somalia, and Zambia). The results were qualita-
tively similar.
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instance, on omitting outliers, COMMS was always significant at
the .05 level when we tried adding the various human capital
variables listed in Table VI.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF OUR MEASURES
We have presented evidence that a variety of social variables
affect growth, at least through factor accumulation. One measure
in particular, COMMS, is also strongly correlated with TFP
growth. Section V showed that this effect is robust to the inclusion
of many different variables. In this section we examine the
relation between the AM variables and other indicators of social
arrangements that have been emphasized in the literature.
Several recent papers have presented evidence that economic
performance is related to ‘‘social capital,’’ where this refers to the
extent of trust and membership in associations. Both La Porta et
al. [1997] and Knack and Keefer [1997] use data from the World
Values Survey to establish a link between trust and economic
growth. Their studies can be seen as complementing ours, in that
the trust data mainly originate from OECD countries from the
1980s onward, whereas our own work focuses on a larger sample
of developing countries, and uses a variable constructed in the
early 1960s. Another difference is our emphasis on social effects
beyond those of trust.
Although the correlations of trust measures with our indexes
of social development are of great interest, the overlap between
the respective samples is small. Using data from Knack and
Keefer [1997], only ten countries fall into both samples. The
correlation of their TRUST measure with SOCDEV is just 0.076,
while that of CIVIC is 20.086.12 It also turns out that SOCDEV is
negatively correlated with Knack and Keefer’s measures of confi-
dence in the government and the density of associational activity.
Similar results apply when we replace SOCDEV with our own
measure based on purely social components, PCSOC5, and with
the single AM measure most closely related to social capital,
OUTLOOK.
Progress is possible, however, if we follow Knack and Keefer
[1997] and distinguish between associations that are likely to act
as distributional coalitions (O-GROUPS, after Olson) and those
12. We have experimented with other measures of trust, including different
treatments of the ‘‘don’t knows’’ in the responses to the World Values Survey. We
have also explored using trust data from a different survey period (1990–1991).
Neither change alters our basic results.
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that involve social interactions that can build trust and coopera-
tive habits (P-GROUPS, after Putnam). As one might conjecture,
SOCDEV has a negative correlation with O-GROUPS (20.74) and
a positive correlation with P-GROUPS (0.73). Although the sam-
ple sizes are very small, and outliers may be important, these
results are suggestive.
One way of enlarging the sample is to consider the correla-
tions between the Knack-Keefer measures and the original data
on communications used by AM. Their calculation of COMMS is
based on data in Russett et al. [1964] covering daily newspaper
circulation and the number of radios per capita.13 Of these two
variables the log of daily newspaper circulation has a particularly
strong correlation with growth. (It has a correlation with SOCDEV
of 0.69.) When it is entered into growth regressions, the pattern of
significance is similar to that of COMMS, although the results
tend to be slightly weaker.
Since the newspaper and radio data are available for devel-
oped countries, as well as those analyzed by AM, we can compare
these data with the TRUST measures for a larger sample, 25–29
countries. TRUST is positively correlated with both daily newspa-
per circulation (0.73) and the number of radios per capita (0.53).
O-GROUPS is not correlated with newspaper circulation (0.12)
but P-GROUPS is (0.73). Both group measures are correlated with
the number of radios per capita, with correlations around 0.50.
These correlations are very interesting, because they suggest
that one reason the mass communications index works so well is
because it proxies for the strength of civic communities, as
reflected in the TRUST and P-GROUPS measures.14 Hence, there
is some indication that COMMS is robustly correlated with
growth because it captures the social capital of developing
countries.
However, we also wish to return to one of the themes of the
Introduction, that society matters in dimensions other than those
emphasized in the social capital literature, at least for factor
accumulation. Many of our results indicate a link between growth
and the SOCDEV variable constructed by AM. This variable is
only weakly correlated with the TRUST indicator used by Knack
13. We checked the data in Russett et al. [1964] against an updated source,
Taylor and Jodice [1983]. Although there are some minor discrepancies in the
series, the correlations between the two sources are above 0.997 for both
newspaper circulation and radios in use.
14. It is worth noting that Helliwell and Putnam [1995] measured ‘‘civic
community’’ partly using data on newspaper readership. Their index helped
explain differing growth rates in Italian regions over 1950–1990.
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and Keefer [1997], and this suggests that it captures things other
than social capital, possibly a broader assessment of the extent of
social development.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The key finding of this paper is that, when combined with
initial income, some basic indexes of social development in the
early 1960s are very useful in predicting subsequent growth. This
is true of the AM index published in 1967. It is also true of other
related indexes: the first principal component of various social
indicators, the extent of mass communications, and newspaper
circulation in 1960. If observers in the early 1960s had given more
emphasis to these indexes of social capability, they might have
been rather more successful in predicting the fast growth of East
Asia, and the underperformance of sub-Saharan Africa.
The indexes also have some predictive power when they are
combined with data on subsequent investment, schooling, and
population growth. This suggests that society is important beyond
its role in determining the fertility rate and the extent of
investments in physical and human capital. It may be that society
matters because it influences the quality of investment, the level
of overall technical efficiency, or the ability of countries to
assimilate technology from abroad.
When we control for physical investment, schooling, and
regional dummies, the effect of the AM index is weaker. At first
sight, this suggests that social arrangements do not act directly
through the technology channel. However, one component of the
AM index, the index of mass communications, is robust even in
these regressions. In Section V we were able to show that this
direct effect is robust to the inclusion of standard proxies for
human capital, urbanization, income distribution, and political
instability.
This work suggests that the indicators compiled by AM do
succeed in capturing some aspect of ‘‘social capability’’ rather than
substituting for other, more conventional variables. Our results
then raise some difficult questions about causal mechanisms. In
Section VI we presented some tentative evidence that the AM
index captures more than simply the extent of trust. This rein-
forces our emphasis on social capability. There are many possible
reasons why society might matter, and their investigation should
be a worthwhile direction for future research.
That said, our work also complements recent research into
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the economic consequences of social capital. In particular, the
extent of mass communications seems to be a good proxy for the
strength of civic communities, as reflected in trust and member-
ship in associations. Unusual for a social measure, the growth
effect is robust to the inclusion of factor accumulation and other
variables. One conclusion we draw is that an assessment of mass
communications, given the absence of other good measures, is
probably the best way of capturing variation in social capital
across developing countries.
HERTFORD COLLEGE, OXFORD UNIVERSITY
VASSAR COLLEGE
APPENDIX: ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FROM ADELMAN AND MORRIS [1967]
Indicators
Rotated factor loadings
R2F1 F2 F3 F4
Per capita GNP, 1961 2.73 .31 2.26 2.03 .699
Size of agriculture .89 2.21 .17 2.08 .869
Extent of dualism 2.84 .14 2.30 .04 .824
Extent of urbanization 2.84 .13 2.12 .02 .741
Character of social organization 2.83 .24 .10 .03 .761
Importance of middle class 2.82 .14 2.23 2.08 .755
Extent of social mobility 2.86 .21 2.18 2.18 .848
Extent of literacy 2.86 .32 .03 2.11 .845
Extent of mass communication 2.88 .28 2.06 2.02 .858
Degree of ethnic homogeneity 2.66 2.30 .34 2.21 .680
Degree of national unity 2.87 2.07 .01 2.18 .792
Crude fertility rate .63 2.14 .05 .18 .448
Modernization of outlook 2.75 .31 2.39 2.03 .805
Strength of democratic institutions 2.48 .72 2.26 2.19 .857
Degree of opposition and press freedom 2.33 .82 2.02 2.10 .802
Competitiveness of political parties 2.32 .79 .08 .25 .801
Basis of political party system 2.43 .70 .04 .01 .681
Strength of labor movement 2.38 .63 2.36 2.05 .678
Political strength of the military 2.26 2.58 .36 .41 .706
Centralization of political power 2.07 2.65 .08 2.02 .432
Strength of traditional elite .08 2.07 .73 .05 .543
Leadership commitment to development 2.14 2.02 2.80 2.21 .699
Degree of administrative efficiency 2.39 .37 2.59 2.16 .663
Degree of social tension .22 .02 .02 .87 .816
Extent of political stability 2.07 .05 2.39 2.82 .821
This appendix reproduces Table IV-1 from AM [1967, p. 151].
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